The Regional Dimension of Collective Wage Bargaining:
Introduction
Within the framework of the debate over the relationship between the structure of wage bargaining and economic performances in Europe, the question concerning the regional dimension returns in a recurring way. The discussion often relates, in particular, to the capacity of wage-setting systems to take into account the important economic disparities between regions. Pench et al. (1999) support for example that a uniform fixation of wages across regions would not be adapted to local job markets. According to Davies and Hallet (2001) , the important regional differences in unemployment observed in numerous European countries are due to the incapacity of the wage-setting systems to take into account the levels of productivity of the least productive regions. 3 The predominance of national industry bargaining, in a large number of European countries, could explain this phenomenon. Accordingly, two types of answers are generally proposed in order to take into account the local environment in the establishment of wages. The first, supported by the European Commission (Davies and Hallet, 2001 ) and the OECD (OECD, 2006) , consists of decentralising wage bargaining towards the company level. The second, which appears regularly in Belgium and in Italy 4 , two countries characterised by important regional differences in unemployment, consists of regionalising wage bargaining.
Within European countries, only Spain and Germany present a regionalised formation of wages. In Spain, Simón et al. (2006) note important variations in wages between regions as well as in wages agreed at the industry level as in actual paid wages. They deduce from this that the regional character of industry bargaining allows for a differentiation of wages between regions. However, these wage differences do not seem to fully reflect local conditions because of the phenomenon of inter-regional imitation within one same industry (Bande et al., 2008) . In the case of Germany the regional differences in industry 3 Other factors such as the differences in economic development, labour qualification and the lack of geographic mobility can also causes differences in unemployment between regions. (Davies et Hallet, 2001) 4 For Italy, see EIRO (1998) .
3 agreed wages are rather weak although wage bargaining is held at the Landers level. The strongly coordinated character of wage bargaining between trade-union confederations and employer associations could explain this situation (Schnabel, 1999) . In the countries where industry bargaining is not regionalised, the regional differences in wages vary significantly. In Italy, the important regional differences in unemployment do not seem to generate large wage disparities. For Dell 'aringa and Pagani (2005) , this can be explained by the existence of wages floor generated by industry agreements which would prevent wages from adapting themselves in the regions of low levels of productivity. The Italian example cannot, however, be carried over to all the countries without regionalised industry bargaining. Indeed, the level of regional wage differentials depends also in the degree of centralisation/coordination of wage bargaining. Vamvakidis (2008) analyses the relation between the degree of coordination of wage bargaining and the regional wage negative relation between the degree of coordination of wage bargaining and the level of regional wage differentials. 6 To sum up, the organisation of the formation of wages at the regional level appears not to be a sufficient condition, neither a necessary condition, for generating high levels of regional wage differences. It seems in fact, in this debate, that the regional character of the wage-setting systems brings less than the degree of centralisation/coordination of wage bargaining.
In Belgium, the regionalisation of wage bargaining is at the heart of current negotiations relative to a de-federalisation of employment policy. The partisans for the regionalisation of wage bargaining 7 argue that the differences in productivity between regions cannot be reflected in a formation of wages at the federal level. They add that a negotiation at the Walloon level would be more sensitive to unemployment and would thus involve lower wages for this region.
5 Expressed by the OECD index taking into account the level of bargaining and the formal or informal coordination between trade unions and employers.
6 Quiet logically, these results are only relevant for the countries characterized by strong differences in regional levels of productivity.
7 Notably the Flemish christian democratic party (CDNV-NVA) and the Flemish liberal party (VLD).
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The present paper discusses the pertinence of a regionalisation of wage bargaining in Belgium in verifying, in an empirical manner, whether the actual wage-setting system (inter-professional agreement, followed by industry agreements, and eventually followed by firm-level agreements) is flexible enough to take into account the regional differences in productivity in the formation of wages.
A way of evaluating the pertinence of the regionalisation of wages in Belgium is to analyse its potential consequences. Bogaert (2008) supports for example that a regionalisation of wages would remove the moderating influence of "francophone" unemployment on Flemish wages. As an effect this would increase wages in Flanders and, through demonstration, would generate similar wage increases in Wallonia. The final result would be a higher increase of wages than in the current federal system. This phenomenon seems to be occurring in Spain where bargaining are already regionalized (Bande et al., 2008) . Deschamps (2003) suggests that a regionalisation of wage bargaining would also increase the complexity of the system and would lead to administrative costs for firms that have production sites in more than one region. Deschamps (2003) also argues that a regionalisation of wages would pave the way to the regionalisation of social security. It would be indeed incoherent to restrict regionalisation solely on wages, and not on total labour costs. Therefore, the contributions to social security, which represents a large part of the total labour costs, would also be regionalised. This could, finally, affect the level of social security spending in the different regions.
Another way of assessing the relevance of the regionalisation of wages would be to discuss the argument that the current system of wage formation is incapable of taking into account the different regional levels of productivity. This approach has the advantage of being tested empirically. Several recent studies have tried to answer this question (Dejemeppe and Van der Linden, 2006; Plasman et al., 2007; Joskin et al., 2008) . Their results seem to indicate that the average labour productivity is lower in Wallonia (Dejemeppe and Van der Linden, 2006; Joskin et al., 2008) but, in the same time, there already exists wage differences between regions (Dejemeppe and Van der Linden, 2006; Plasman et al., 2007) .
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These wage differences, nonetheless, only take partially into account the differences in productivity. Indeed, according to Dejemeppe and Van der Linden (2006) and Joskin et al. (2008) , the unit labour cost is, in average 8 higher in Wallonia than in the rest of the country. The data used in this last analysis suffer nonetheless from two limitations:
Firstly, they are macro-level data so they do not allow taking into account eventual composition effects. Secondly, they do not distinguish between salaried workers and selfemployed workers whose revenues are not determined by collective bargaining.
Based on these empirical results, one can legitimately ask how the current system could take into account the regional differences in productivity. The possibility to complete the national industry agreements by agreements at the firm level could be the explanation (Dejemeppe and Van der Linder, 2006; Plasman et al., 2007) . Verly (2003) estimates that, in Belgium, approximately half of the employees is affected by a wage bargaining process on a level other than the national. On one hand, several joint committees are subdivided into sub-joint committees at the regional level. These joint committees cover nearly 16 % of employees in the private sector. 9 On the other hand, industry agreements can be completed by agreements at the company level. These concern nearly 27 % of employees in the private sector. 10 The existence of wage differences between regions could therefore be explained by these two mechanisms. In the current literature, only the study by Plasman et al. (2007) empirically establishes a link between the presence of regional wage differentials and company bargaining. However, no study investigates the influence of regional sub-joint committees.
The objective of this contribution is therefore double. First, we want to see if the current system of wage formation takes into account regional differences in productivity. To do so, we estimate regional wage differentials in each joint committee and we check if these differentials are correlated to regional productivity differentials in these joint committees.
Second, we want to identify the mechanisms that allow for the regional differences in 8 There are differences across sectors. joint committees where the percentage of employees covered by a firm agreement is relatively high) to centralised joint committees, as well as joint committees subdivided in regional sub-joint committees to those that are not.
The rest of the article is divided into five sections. In the first section, we present the dataset used for the estimations. In the second section we check if there exist differences in wages between regions. In the third section, we test if these differences in wages are explained by differences in productivity. In the fourth section, we question the mechanisms that allow for the regional differences in productivity to be reflected in wages. Finaly, the fifth section concludes.
Data
The present study is based upon a unique combination of two large-scale data sets. The . This is a firm-level survey, also conducted by Statistics Belgium, with a different coverage than the SES in that it includes neither the banking sector, nor the electricity sector, nor firms with less than 20 employees. The SBS provides firm-level information on value-added per employee, which will be used as a proxy for labour productivity. Since the dataset covers only firms whose employ salaried workers, the productivity is therefore only that of 
Are there differences in wages between regions?
Without controlling for differences in characteristics between regions, the mean hourly wage 12 in Brussels is 8.2% higher than in Flanders and 11.1% than in Wallonia. The mean hourly wage is, in Flanders, 1.8% higher than in Wallonia. These differences in 11 A local unit corresponds to all the establishments of a company situated in the same commune and coming from the same sector of activity.
12 Gross hourly wage includes overtime paid, premiums for shift, night and/or week-end work, and regular bonuses. It does not include irregular payments which do not occur during each pay period, such as pay for holiday, 13 th month, profit-sharing, etc.
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wages can nonetheless be affected by differences in characteristics between the regions.
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In particular, employees in Brussels are on average more qualified than those that work in the other regions, which most likely comes from Brussels' status as a metropolis, capital seniority in the company, type of contract, working hours, being working in a team or during night or weekend). The occupation variable is nonetheless not very disaggregated (9 functions for the workers and 12 for the employers) compared to many classifications of occupations in industries or firms. Consequently, it could be that our estimates are biased by the fact that the occupations are distributed differently in the three regions. In order to reduce this bias, we also control for the joint committee, the industry (NACE nomenclature -3 digits-), the gender, the level of education, the form of economic and financial control, and the size of the company. Moreover, we control for the fact that the employee works overtime. The results of these estimations are presented in the first column (model 1) in Table 1 . Controlling for differences in characteristics, the differences between Flanders and Wallonia increases slightly (reaching 2.4 %) whilst the differential between Brussels and Wallonia falls to 2.6% and the differential between Brussels and Flanders disappear completely. Most of the wage differential between Brussels and the two other regions thus seems to be explained by differences in characteristics between regions. 14 Prior potential experience = age-senority in the company -estimated number of years of schooling -6. 15 The complete results of the wage equations are presented in appendix. Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; T stats are reported between brackets ; a : Regional wage differentials based on ordinary least squares estimates of wage equations. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980) and common variance components within groups (Moulton, 1990 These results can nonetheless hide some disparities between joint committees. In order to verify this, we have estimated the wage differentials by joint committee. The choice of the joint committee is justified by the fact that this is the predominant level of bargaining in Belgium and that it is this level that could potentially be regionalised. Tables 2 to 4 synthesise the results. The complete denomination of the joint committees is given in the appendix. Nearly half of the Walloon workers 16 from the sample work in a joint committee where there exists a significant statistical wage differential with Flanders 16 To be correct, they are "workers who are employed in Wallonia": the data coming from the workplace an not the home place.
and/or with Brussels (see Table 2 and 3). In the majority of cases, wages are lower in Wallonia and the differentials are, on average, a bit more than 8 %. For the 3 joint committees where wages are higher in Wallonia (textile, cleaning, and big stores), the differentials are weaker and are around 4 %. Concerning the comparison between Brussels and Flanders, the proportion of employees who work in a joint committee where there exists a significant regional wage difference is smaller (31.2% of Flemish workers and 21.9% of workers from Brussels). Again, wages are most often higher in Flanders.
However, one can see a bigger symmetry in the differentials: they are around 8% both when wages are higher in Flanders and in Brussels. It seems therefore that the absence of wage differentials between Flanders and Brussels that was obtained for all joint committees taken together is due to the fact that the differentials within each joint committee compensate each other. One thus sees here the relevance to lead an analysis at the joint committee level rather than at the aggregate national level.
To summarize, it seems that the Belgian system of wage bargaining does not prevent having differences in wages between the regions, even if the situation varies according to the joint committee and the regions that are compared. 
Are the regional wage differentials explained by regional differences in productivity?
To answer this question, we, first, introduce the average firm's productivity in the wage equations in order to see if regional wage differentials vary in comparison to the basic specification. The wage differentials estimated via this specification are presented in the second row (model 2) in Table 1 . The introduction of a firm's productivity in the wage equations makes the wage differentials between Flanders and Wallonia go from 2.4 % to 1.9 % and the differentials between Brussels and Wallonia go from 2.6% to 1.8%. The wage differential between Brussels and Flanders does not change when we control for firm's productivity. In other words, part of the wage differentials between Wallonia and the two other regions seems to be explained by differences in productivity between the firms situated in the different regions. One still needs to consider these results with prudence given the fact that the differences between the differentials of the two models are not statistically significant.
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This first result in mind, we want to see if the regional differentials in wage and productivity for each joint committee are correlated. Using the results from the 3 samples, the analysis is based on 87 wage differentials and 87 productivity differentials.
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Graphic 1 puts in relation the regional wage and productivity differentials within each joint committee. Each point on the graphic represents one joint committee. Most of the joint committees are represented several times as they are present in more than one sample. As the graphic shows, wage and productivity differentials seem to be positively correlated. This is confirmed by the coefficient of correlation between the two differentials which is 0.38 and significant at 1%. 17 In other terms, one cannot exclude the hypothesis in which the differentials of the two models are identical. 18 The methodology for the calculation of wage differentials per joint committee is presented in appendix 4.
The wage and productivity differentials per joint committee are presented in appendix 5. Notes: Regional wage differentials are estimated using the regional dummy variables in the different wage equations (estimated by OLS). The per capita firm's value added serves as proxy to the productivity level.
What mechanism allows for regional productivity differentials to be reflected in wages?
In addition to the inter-professional and industry bargaining levels that are national, two other levels of bargaining exist in Belgium. First, some joint committees are subdivided into regional sub-joint committees. Secondly, industry agreements can be completed through bargaining at the company level. The existence of regional wage differentials could therefore be explained by these two mechanisms. Can bargaining at the company level explain how regional differences in productivity lead to regional wage differentials? In order to verify this hypothesis, we compare the relation between the regional wage and productivity differentials in the centralised joint committees and in the decentralised joint committees. We consider a joint committee to 13 be decentralised if the percentage of wages covered by firm-level collective agreement is superior to the median, which is to say 28%. If the hypothesis is correct, the relation between productivity differentials and wage differentials should be higher in decentralised joint committees, meaning where the level of the company has an important weight in determining wages. 17 Our results show that the correlation between the two differentials is 0.50 and is significant at 1% for the decentralised joint committees, whilst it is only 0.30 and significant to the 5% for the centralised joint committees. Graphics 2 and 3 illustrate these results. Notes: Regional wage differentials are estimated using the regional dummy variables in the different wage equations (estimated by OLS). The per capita firm's value added serves as proxy to the productivity level. 17 One must be aware that we cannot distinguish if the decentralization concerns wage levels (classification of functions and/or determination of regular bonuses), wage increases or both. The information from the database indicates only the eventual presence of a company-specific agreement, which could be carried on wages or on work time. 
Regional Productivity Differentials
Notes: Regional wage differentials are estimated using the regional dummy variables in the different wage equations (estimated by OLS). The per capita firm's value added serves as proxy to the productivity level.
The comparison of the two graphics shows a stronger relation between the wage and productivity differentials for decentralised joint committees then for centralised ones, where relatively high productivity differentials can be associated to relatively low wage differentials. These results seem to validate the hypothesis that the presence of companyspecific agreement may allow wages to adapt to regional productivity differentials.
Nonetheless, it is possible that the subdivision of joint committees into regional sub-joint committees also allows wages to adapt to regional differentials in productivity. Only 3 joint committees are subdivided into regional sub-joint committees in our sample. This is the case of the Joint Committee for the manufacture of metal, mechanical and electrical products 15 (111), the Joint Committee for white collar workers employed in the manufacture of metal products (209) and the Joint Committee of urban and regional transport (328). One should note that this subdivision is not necessarily done according to the region. The metallic production sector (CP 111.1 and 111.2), for example, is divided into 10 regional committees. 19 The correlation between regional wage and productivity differentials for these joint committees is 0.76 and is significant at 5%. It seems therefore that the subdivision of joint committees into regional sub-joint committees also allows wages to adapt to regional differentials in productivity. One must, nonetheless, consider this result with prudence since the number of observations used in this calculation is relatively low. 20 Considering that these 3 joint committees are classified in the decentralised joint committee category 21 , one can ask if the results relative to the degree of centralisation are not affected by the local subdivision of these joint committees. In order to verify this, we calculate the coefficient of correlation for the decentralised joint committees by excluding the 3 regional subdivided joint committees. The correlation diminishes very slightly from 0.50 to 0.49 and is still significant at 1%, which confirms that companyspecific agreements equally allow for regional productivity differentials to be reflected in wage differentials.
Conclusion
Within the framework of the debate over the relationship between the structure of wage bargaining and economic performances in Europe, the question concerning the regional dimension returns in a recurring way. The discussion often relates, in particular, to the capacity of wage-setting systems to take into account the important economic disparities between regions.
In Belgium, the regionalisation of wage bargaining is at the heart of current negotiations relative to a de-federalisation of employment policy. The partisans for the regionalisation of wage bargaining argue that the differences in productivity between regions cannot be reflected in a formation of wages at the federal level. They add that a negotiation at the Wallonia level would be more sensitive to unemployment and would thus involve lower wages for this region.
In this article we have put forward the fact that an important proportion of Belgian employees are covered by joint committees which allow significant regional wage differentials. In addition, regional wage differentials and productivity differentials by joint committee are strongly correlated. These two results permit to conclude that the federal characteristic of the Belgian system of wage bargaining allow wages to adapt to differences in regional productivity. It could be argue, however, that this level of flexibility is not sufficient, in the sense that it does not remove the regional differences in terms of unit labour cost. Our results do not allow us to answer this question.
Nevertheless our study has highlighted the mechanisms that allow wages to adapt to regional productivity. We observe that the correlation between regional wage differentials and regional productivity differentials is higher in decentralised joint commissions (whereby company-specific agreement has a significant impact on the wage setting) and in joint committees subdivided in regional sub-joint committees. Therefore, it seems that it is the possibility to negotiate wages at the company level and the existence of regional sub-joint committees that allow wages to adapt to the regional productivity differentials.
If wages are not enough sensitive to the local specificities, these two mechanisms could be extended. This solution has the advantage of avoiding increasing administrative complexities in joint committees where a more important wage differential is not necessary. Moreover, the decision to increase the weight of company-specific agreements or to subdivide joint committees is taken by the national joint committees, composed of those close to the reality on the field. In addition, these mechanisms allow not only taking into account differences between regions but equally differences between provinces, 18 labour pools or companies. Lastly, as already pointed by several authors, regionalisation of wage bargaining could create a higher increase in wages than in the current national system, and could open the path to the regionalisation of the social security. In conclusion, the current system already contains the mechanisms that allow for regional differences in productivity to be reflected in wages. It is therefore not certain that a regionalisation of the wage setting system is necessary.
Finally, let us note that increasing regional wage differentials will increase wage inequalities but the impact on unemployment is unknown Future research should focus at the regional level on the impact of an increasing wage dispersion on the employment level. Nevertheless, other paths should also be followed in order to increase the level of employment, notably investment in education, training and R&D, or reductions of social security contributions aimed at low-skilled workers. Notes : * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; T stats are reported between brackets ; Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980) and common variance components within groups (Moulton, 1990) . a : covers the joint committees No 100, 111, 112, 116, 118, 119, 121, 124, 126, 130, 136, 140, 149, 201, 202, 207, 209, 211, 218, 220, 226, 302, 311, 312, 313 
The mean logarithm of the gross hourly wages of individuals working in Wallonia and belonging to the joint committee No 201 is given by:
The difference 
All the regional wage differentials by joint committees are presented in the appendix 5.
Complete wage equations are available on request. 
